The Muscatine Button Workers\u27 Strike of 1911-12 by Rousmaniere, Kate
The Annals of Iowa 
Volume 46 Number 4 (Spring 1982) pps. 243-262 
The Muscatine Button Workers' Strike of 1911-12 
Kate Rousmaniere 
ISSN 0003-4827 
No known copyright restrictions. 
Recommended Citation 
Rousmaniere, Kate. "The Muscatine Button Workers' Strike of 1911-12." The Annals of 
Iowa 46 (1982), 243-262. 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.8857 
Hosted by Iowa Research Online 
The Muscatine Button Workers'
Strike of 1911-12
An Iowa Community in Conflict
KATE ROUSMANIERE
IHE PASTORAL BACKDROP of an Iowa river town might not seem
a likely setting for industrial strife. Labor uprisings at the turn
of the century are more frequently envisioned in urban slums
with overcrowded sweat shops and tenements jammed with
immigrant workers. Muscatine, Iowa was never so unfortunate.
The small city on the bluffs of the Mississippi River was sur-
rounded by the agrarian culture and economy of Iowa and
Illinois. But lodged in this rural environment was a booming
button industry that all but monopolized the city and the local
labor force. The strike of the Muscatine button workers' union
in 1911-12 is a significant example of the chaos inflicted on a
rural community in the process of industrialization. The history
of the strike includes the story of community dynamics as well
as industrial conflict.
On February 25, 1911 a majority of the forty-three fresh-
water pearl button factories in Muscatine shut down produc-
tion. The manufacturers claimed that the shutdown was due to
overproduction. The 2,500 laid-off workers declared it was a
threat against their newly organized union. The shutdown
lasted one month, but the conflicts between the button workers'
THE ANNALS OF IOWA
union and the manufacturers resulted in a fifteen-month boy-
cott of the factories.^
This industrial strike was unusual in labor history in that it
occurred in a small city in a state that led the nation in agricul-
tural production. In such a setting, the progress and character
of Iowa's industry and industrial laborers is very different from
that of northeastern industrial states. Although Iowa was tra-
ditionally an agricultural state, at the turn of the century in-
dustry was growing rapidly. Urban-industrial centers grew in
population between 1900 and 1910, drawing partly on rural
migration to the cities. In 1910 Iowa's seventeen cities with
populations of ten thousand or more inhabitants produced
almost three-fourths of the state's total manufacturing value. In
the five year period between 1904 and 1909, the total value of
Iowa's industrial products had increased by 61 percent. This
growth hardly placed Iowa at the top of industrial states. In
1909 less than 3 percent of the state's population were industrial
wage earners and Iowa contributed less than 2 percent of all the
nation's industries. While urban and industrial development
was minimal in comparison to other states, this growth was
substantial in relation to Iowa's smaller and more agrarian
population.^
Agricultural supporters and popularized rural proponents
reacted against urban industrialization in the Corn Belt. The
dominant agrarian view of cities was as corrupt centers of im-
migrants, unions, and plutocrats, filled with diseases and indus-
1. The fifteen months that the Muscatine button workers' union was out
of work have alternately been called a "lockout" and a "strike." The manu-
facturers called the factory closing a "shutdown" or "layoff." Four days after
the incident the union declared it to be a "lockout," meaning the manufactur-
ers had intentionally locked the workers out of the factories. As the situation
developed in the following months, newspapers began to call the situation a
"strike," meaning the union was intentionally boycotting the factories. The
less incriminating terms "shutdown" and "boycott" are used here, except in
circumstances where the manufacturers' locking out or the union's striking is
the issue. The term "unionist" identifies only Muscatine button workers'
union members.
2. U.S. Bureau oí the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States,
1910: Abstract of the Census with Supplement for ¡owa {Washington. D.C.,
1913), 683-684 {hereafter cited as Thirteenth Census).
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trial disasters. American agriculture was reaching its limit of
expansion at the turn of the century and the migration to the
cities caused serious concern to many Americans. "The men and
women on the farm stand for what is fundamentally best and
most needed in our American life," President Theodore Roose-
velt told Congress in 1910, initiating the Country Life move-
ment aimed at regenerating the rural areas of the nation.^
The comparatively smaller size of Iowa's industry and the
distances between industrial centers contributed to the prevail-
ing attitude that Iowa was only an agricultural state. Iowa
differed from industrial states in that her industry was not con-
centrated in one central region. Six of the largest and most
industrialized of the seventeen cities were on the eastern side of
the state along the Mississippi River (Dubuque, Clinton, Dav-
enport, Muscatine, Burlington, and Keokuk). All of these cities
were in separate counties and none were closer than the twenty-
five miles between Davenport and Muscatine. These distances
served to lessen the overall impact of Iowa's industrial develop-
ment, in contrast to the neighboring largely agrarian state of
Illinois which had its industry concentrated in Chicago. The
local and national lack of awareness of Iowa's industrial com-
ponent resulted in the lack of concern and action for appropri-
ate legislation within the state/
Iowa's manufacturers were the first to complain that wide-
spread agrarian attitudes were restricting urban-industrial
interests in the state. They claimed that Iowa investors were
more willing to lend to farms than to factories, that interest
rates and average insurance rates were more than double those
in some eastern states, and that the state's general assembly was
suspicious and unsupportive of new industries. Iowa's indus-
trial laborers were severely affected by the dominant rural
attitudes. Iowa at the turn of the century was one of the few
states in the nation with no laws or regulation protecting
3. William Bowers, "Fanners and Reformers in an Urban Age: The
Country Life Movement and the 'Rural Problem,' 1900-1920" (M.A. thesis.
University of Iowa, 1968), 172; "Report of the Country Life Commission,"
Document #705, Congressional Documents, 60th Congress, 2nd Session.
4. Ruth A. Gallaher, Legal and Political Status of Women in Iowa (Iowa
City: State Historical Society, 1918), 154.
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Pearl button factory, Muscatine. ca. 1900.
workers' health and safety. In 1900 the first Iowa Labor Com-
missioner to inspect factories found large numbers of fire traps,
unguarded machinery, and unsanitary conditions. According to
the Commissioner's report, working conditions for some two-
thirds to three-fourths of the workers were hazardous to their
health and safety. In a 1912 study of work accidents in Iowa,
E. H. Downey judged that the yearly number of accidents was
two to three times greater than the 3,351 incidents reported by
the State Bureau of Labor in 1910.^
In 1911, no wage or hour protective legislation existed for
women workers in Iowa who averaged 15 percent of the state's
wage-earning population. Despite the Factory Act of 1902
which prohibited children fourteen years and younger from
working, a 1904 special report found over 2,500 children fifteen
years and younger working in industrial establishments. It was
clear to most investigators, then and afterwards, that manu-
facturers were succeeding in circumventing the child labor
legislation, that local authorities were often "criminally neg-
5. Keach Johnson, "Iowa's Industrial Roots: Some Social and Political
Problems," Annals of Iowa 44 (Winter and Spring 1978): 249-252, 262, 266-
267; Iowa Bureau of Labor Statistics, Ninth Biennial Report. 1899-1900 (Des
Moines, 1901), 6-22.
246
Button Workers' Strike
ligent," and that state labor legislation in Iowa was far behind
the nation in protecting workers."
The distance between industrial centers hindered the or-
ganization of large inter-city workers' protective unions. The
small size of most Iowa factories further discouraged trade
union formation. Over half of Iowa's factories employed less
than fifty workers each, compared to New England and North
Atlantic states where the majority of factories employed over
one hundred workers. While local labor unions in Iowa were
numerous in the early 1900s, the large building trade unions
were the only unions of significant power until the 1930s.'
MUSCATINE in 1911 was in many ways reflective of a typical
Iowa industrial city. It was one of the seventeen cities in 1910
with a population of over ten thousand. The major industries
were established fairly early: by 1900 the city had 105 industrial
establishments; it added only eight by 1910. Characteristic
of Iowa's poor labor conditions, in 1910 Muscatine County was
among the top ten Iowa counties most in need of factory im-
provements recommended by the State Labor Commission.^
Muscatine was distinguished by the fresh-water pearl
button industry that dominated the city's manufacturing. Mus-
catine led the production of fresh-water pearl buttons in the
state, second only to New York State in 1905. In 1910 almost
two-thirds of Iowa's fresh-water pearl button employees
worked in the forty-three plants in Muscatine. Of the city's
3,500 wage earners, over half were button workers.'
The first fresh-water pearl button industry in the world
was started in 1891 in Muscatine by John F. Boepple, a German
immigrant. Boepple traveled to the Midwest in the 1880s
6. Iowa Bureau of Labor Statistics, Fifteenth Biennial Report. 1910-1911
(Des Moines, 1912); Johnson, "Iowa's Industrial Roots," 263-271; Gallaher,
Status of Women, 148.
7. Albert M. Jarvis, "Unionism in Iowa Before 1914" (M.A. thesis, Uni-
versity oí Iowa, 1928), ii, vi, xiii; Thirteenth Census, 469.
8. In 1910 Muscatine's population was 16,178. Thirteenth Census, 690,
703.
9. Thirteenth Census. 684, 690.
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searching for an abundant source of river shells from which he
could cut buttons. He found such a source in the shallows and
banks of the Mississippi around Muscatine and began to cut
buttons with a simple hand-run machine. The industry quickly
boomed and drew entire families into the business of digging
clams and manufacturing crude buttons in woodshed
"factories." Machines were inefficient, worksmanship was
poor, and living conditions were chaotic in the shack towns on
the river banks. By 1900 an automatic button cutting machine
had been invented, sky-rocketing the industry so that by 1905
over half of all button factories were making fresh-water pearl
buttons. (Buttons were also made from metal, salt-water pearl
shells, vegetable ivory, cloth, and bone.) In 1897 there were
three button factories in Muscatine; within four years the num-
ber jumped to twenty-seven; and by 1911, forty-three factories
in Muscatine were involved in button manufacturing.'"
These factories varied in size and type of production. There
were ten large "finishing" plants that included all stages of
machine work, and six which merely cut the shells into the
round button shapes, called blanks. Factories involved in one
stage of production sold to other Muscatine factories as did
many of the twenty-seven button factories outside Muscatine.
All work in the button factories was sex segregated. The
button industry ranked fourth among the state's industries in
the number of women employed. Conditions for female
workers were notoriously bad, causing one journalist in 1911 to
declare that women's work in the Muscatine button factories
was worse than that in the large garment industry at that time.
The machine and manual work for both sexes was unpleasant,
however. The work demanded few skills for the tedious assem-
bly line of specialized tasks. Button making in 1911 was hardly
the artisan craft that it once was for John Boepple.''
The process for making buttons from fresh-water clam
10. Mike O'Hara, 'Mr, Boepple and His Buttons," The lowan 30 (Fall
1981):47: Frances S. Hurd, "The Pearl Button Industry of Muscatine, Iowa,"
Annais of Iowa 38 (Fall 1966):401; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Special Report
of the Census Office: Manufactures. Part III. Selected Industries: Buttons
(Washington, D.C., 1905), 207.
11. Thirteenth Census, 704; Pauline Newman, 'The Strike of the Button
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shells began outside the factory where diggers dragged the river
or lake with long rakes collecting clams. The clams were then
fired to open the shells. The meat was scraped out and fed to
hogs and the shells sold to button manufacturers. The factory
work for manufacturing buttons involved both machine and
manual work with unskilled and semi-skilled workers per-
forming specialized tasks on the assembly line. At all stages of
production, the buttons were handled individually since the
shells varied in size and thickness.
The button cutters, who were all male, pulled the shells
from the soaking vats where the remaining clam meat had been
decaying from the shells. After days of soaking, the water in the
vats was putrid and poisonous enough to cause blood poisoning
and infections on the workers' hands and arms. The cutters used
automatic tubular saw machines to cut blanks from the shells.
The cutters' work rooms were damp and smelly and the air was
thick with shell dust from the unventilated machines. Workers
complained that the majority of both male and female workers
had some form of throat disease or tuberculosis caused by the
heavy dust.
Women worked automatic machines that drilled the button
holes, pressed patterns, and polished the buttons. One investi-
gator found the polishers to be mostly girls of fourteen and
fifteen who arranged the buttons on a moving belt to be
smoothed by the machinery. The polishing machines had no
exhaust tubes and the workers breathed thick unfiltered shell
dust. The drilling and pressing machines did have exhaust
pipes, but the unprotected mechanisms frequently gashed or cut
off workers' fingers. Despite a state law prohibiting women
from cleaning machines in motion, women in the button fac-
tories were required to do so and often a fine was deducted from
wages if the machine was not properly cleaned. Most women
button workers were employed as sorters and button carders.
Sorting rooms had large windows for lighting and large tables
at which the women sat side by side separating and counting the
finished buttons. Carders worked at home sewing buttons onto
Workers in Muscatine," The Progressive Woman. February 1912, 6; "Buttons
—Pearl Buttons," Life and Labor, May 1911, 143. :
249
THE ANNALS OF IOWA
cardboard pieces to be sold at retail. Carders received one and a
half cents for sewing a gross of buttons onto cards.
Most women, regardless of their job, were apparently paid
by the finished piece. Piecework wages were the customary
system of payment for women workers in industries around the
country at this time. The piecework system encouraged women
to work faster and longer and often to bring work home after
hours. Typically the employers set wage scales by the working
rate of the fastest workers and then lowered them when more
women learned to work equally fast, thereby always encour-
aging more production for the same wage. Working hours
varied from factory to factory. The 1910 Iowa state manu-
facturing census reported that in the state, button factories
employed the highest number of workers for fifty-four to sixty
hours a week and the third highest number of workers for over
seventy-two hours a week.^ ^
The system of weighing and counting the finished buttons
was always a major point of contention between the factory
workers and their employers. The manufacturers paid workers
on a gross of 168 buttons but sold the product on a normal gross
of 144. The manufacturers' claim was that of every 168 buttons
made, 24 would be imperfect. Workers argued that they were
not getting paid for the time and labor of making the extra 24
buttons. Workers further suspected fraud in the weighing of the
buttons and it was not until 1933 that workers were allowed to
see their buttons weighed. Some factories held noon religious
services for the workers at which time the management weighed
the buttons and falsified the results."
Prior to the formation of the button workers' protective
union in 1910, there were two attempts at organizing the Mus-
catine button workers. These locals, founded in 1897 and 1903,
12. Of the few sources available on job descriptions and conditions of the
Muscatine button workers, most are from factory investigations by women
journalists for feminist or women s labor union periodicals. These sources
support Pauline Newman's claim that working conditions for female workers
were notoriously bad and also offer an insight into the large amount of
women laborers' activism in the strike. Newman, "Strike of the Button
Workers," 6; Annie Maclean, Wage-Earning Women (New York: Macmillan
Co., 1910), 88; Thirteenth Census. 689.
13. Des Moines News. 15 April 1911; "Buttons—Pearl Buttons," 144.
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survived for a few years but eventually disintegrated with no
labor victories. The monopoly that the button factories had
over the labor and business of the city discouraged union ac-
tivity. The large numbers of button workers offered great
potential for unionization, however. Whole families worked in
the factories, sons and daughters of local farmers lodged in the
city to work, and many wealthy townswomen did piece work at
home. Frequently, townspeople worked at a single button fac-
tory for most of a working career. Because of the wide spectrum
and large numbers of workers, no class distinction existed
between button workers and other laborers and city residents.
Any intra-city conflict was between the consistently underpaid
employees and the manufacturers."*
In early 1911, conditions were ripe for labor activity in
Muscatine. Newspapers of previous months were riddled with
reports of strikes all over the nation. The flood of garment
strikes in 1910 and 1911 might well have been the cause for the
manufacturers' claimed overproduction of buttons: fewer gar-
ments required buttons. Button workers complained of a cut in
wages due to the production slow down. Furthermore, along-
side the fearful growth of the button workers' union and other
labor unions in the city, the recently established local Socialist
party was strengthening. -f . .
I N EARLY NOVEMBER 1910, a local Iowa union organizer
founded the Muscatine Button Workers Protective Union,
initially with a membership of nine men and twenty-nine
women. By late January 1911 there were over one thousand
members. The union, sensing the manufacturers' resistance,
issued a sardonic statement refuting the rumor that the union
was agitating: ". . . We were never on better terms with the
employers than we are at the present time," the union statement
read," . . . It was mentioned that the button cutters resented
the cut in wages which certain factories made, but that state-
14. Iowa State Federation of Labor, Official Labor Directory. 1897-1911;
Interview with Mabel Bartenhagen, 12 ]une 1974, Tape OHT-30, Musser
Public Library, Muscatine, Iowa; Interview with Walter Conway, 23 March
1977, Tape OHT-75, Musser Public Library; Newman, "Strike of the Button
Workers." . -.,. ,
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ment . . . wasgiven without our consent. We are all happy and
content and have no cause of resentment."^^ Despite such pub-
licly claimed contentment, the union grew to 2,500 members
and all but a few hundred button workers were in the union.
The Muscatine News-Tribune claimed this to be the largest
union in any city in Iowa.^ *
On February 25 all of the large button factories and all but
one of the small ones announced a shutdown for an indefinite
period. About 2,500 men and women workers were laid off.
There is no report of the number of plants that originally shut
down or the number of workers affected. Reports vary from
"practically every factory" to only the large plants, and from
1,000 to 2,500 workers affected. Most newspapers report an
"almost complete" shutdown. Eventually, all of the forty-three
button factories in Muscatine shut down production.
Manufacturers later claimed that despite rumors that the
new union would demand wage increases of up to 100 percent
and that union officers had been appointed in each department
of every factory, "the shutdown would not have been made on
account of the union alone." A shutdown for December had
already been planned due to overproduction and the recent
financial depression in the East.^ ^
The union immediately asserted that the shutdown was in
fact a lockout intending to threaten workers out of the union.
The lockout was "premeditated and without cause" because the
union claimed it had never made demands on the employers nor
did it contemplate such action. The union "fully realized that
any action ¡on its part] would have furnished an excuse for the
very move that the employers have made without any excuse."
Furthermore, the continued operation of the button factories
outside of Muscatine proved the financial argument false. If
overproduction was really the cause of the shutdown, the man-
ufacturers would not have offered re-employment to those
workers who destroyed their union cards, or commenced pro-
15. "Buttons—Pearl Buttons," 143; Union statement quoted in Muscatine
News-Tribune, 20 January 1911.
16. Muscatine News-Tribune, 20 January 1911.
17. Ibid., 16 March 1911.
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duction less than one month after the shutdown with non-union
workers.^"
Throughout March the button workers organized rapidly
and peacefully. Despite a public belief that the shutdown would
last only several weeks, the union organized with the intent of a
longer siege. Political support and financial relief was requested
immediately of local and national labor organizations. The
response was encouraging. Samuel Gompers, president of the
American Federation of Labor expressed his support and sent
the AFL national treasurer to Muscatine. Emmett Flood, na-
tional organizer for the AFL, became a long-term coordinator
for the union and the Women's Trade Union League sent four
women to Muscatine to organize the women unionists and help
in the relief committees. In the first six months of the shutdown
the union hosted the president of the WTUL and the president
of the Iowa State Federation of Labor. The state labor commis-
sioner and the governor of Iowa also visited to investigate the
situation. ^ ^
A large part of the city supported the unionists. The em-
ployment monopoly of the button industry was so complete
that a majority of the townspeople had at one time or another
worked in a button factory. The entire city felt threatened by
the control that the industry had on employment and business.
In the early weeks of the shutdown, unionists were publicly
offered free meeting space, publicity, entertainment, housing,
and food. °^
The union maintained a tight organization from the begin-
ning. A mass meeting of all unionists was held once every two
weeks. Individual factory unions met daily, as did the executive
board. The union opened a kitchen for single men and women
unionists and issued scrip tickets with which union families
bought food from supporting groceries. The union produced a
newspaper and bulletins covering developments and représenta-
is . Ibid.
19. Ibid., 5 March, 29 March, 7 April, 27 April 1911; Life and Labor,
December 1911, 378.
20. Muscatine News-Tribune. 31 March 1911; Newman, "Strike of the
Button Workers," 6.
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tives were continually sent to local unions and button factories.
Pickets were held at the factories for many weeks. ^ ^
In light of the predominantly foreign born and ethnic
membership of unions in other cities, labor reporters noted with
surprise the great majority of native-born Anglo-Saxon mem-
bers of the button workers' union. One Socialist reporter was
greatly encouraged by the fact that western Americans were
capable of organizing themselves. Of the approximately 2,500
union members, there were sixty Russians, fifteen black men,
and a handful of Poles, Greeks, and Italians. Almost all of the
women were native-born white Americans. For example. Pearl
McGill, the secretary of the union, was a farmer's daughter who
went into the button factories for temporary employment in
order to pay her way through teacher's training."
Women formed a necessary cooperative component of the
union during the long shutdown. Organized into various com-
mittees, women arranged the housing, clothing, and feeding of
the unemployed. Two women acted as representatives to the
Chicago AFL. A committee of twelve women protested to the
county attorney that an arrested woman unionist had been
mistreated and subjected to foul language. Women were in the
forefront of pickets and marches; four of the twelve members of
the union executive committee were women. Women unionists
were instrumental in the founding of the Juvenile Button
Sewers' and Carriers' Union—the organization of about seven
hundred children who had been carriers and button carders
before the shutdown."
During the shutdown women unionists leveled charges of
sexual harassment at factory employers and managers. One
source recalled a manager who was a notorious "womanizer."
The union claimed that one manufacturer attempted to seduce a
woman unionist and offered her money if she would spy on the
union for him. One woman claimed that in the factory where
she worked "the manager had a 'resting room' where some of
21. Muscatine News-Tribune. 4 March, 14 April 1911; "Buttons—Pearl
Buttons," 144.
22. Newman, "Strike of the Button Workers," 6.
23. Life and Labor, December 1911, 278; Newman, "Strike of the Button
Workers," 6.
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Button factory assembly line,
Muscatine, ca. 1912.
the girls had, at one time or another, to give in to his devilish
demands, and for which they were reciprocated with a steady
job. Those who did not comply with his wishes were dis-
charged." Women workers from other factories made similar
claims; once on strike, they were willing to admit incidents of
sexual harassment from the management."
The strike encouraged the growth of the local Socialist
party, which culminated in the March 6 city election of two
Socialist aldermen. The Muscatine News-Tribune charged that
the two-week-old button industry shutdown was directly re-
sponsible for the Socialist gains and that at least 65 percent of
the button workers voted the Socialist ticket. O. C. Wilson,
who was one of the victors, served much of his term as business
agent for the button workers' union. Although this was the first
Socialist victory in a city election in Iowa, the Socialist influ-
ence should not be over-emphasized. The local and national
24. "Girls Beware," Button Workers Union Bulletin, Musser Public
Library; Newman, "Strike of the Button Workers," 6; Philip S. Foner, Women
and the American Labor Movement, 2 vols. (New York: Free Press, 1979),
1:357.
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Socialist party endorsed and aided the unionists, but it is clear
that the union did not align itself with the party.^^
The organizing activities of the button workers' union
during the shutdown reflected a community atmosphere of
mutual support and worker identification. The small and fairly
isolated rural character of Muscatine might have encouraged, if
not demanded, such cooperation and involvement from all
sectors of the button workers' community. Traditional sex roles
were partly broken when large numbers of women unionists
took a hand in organizing relief activities and initiating protests,
while many of the unemployed men worked in the union
kitchen. Men and women who had previously worked in sex-
segregated jobs collaborated to improve the working conditions
of both. The aid of local townspeople and farmers was instru-
mental in forming a community of cooperative work. This
strong community identity fostered a structure that carried the
unionists through fifteen months of unemployment.
One lengthy negotiation attempt took place in the first
weeks following the shutdown. John B. Lennon, national trea-
surer of the AFL, acted as arbitrator but the negotiations were
abruptly broken off when the manufacturers refused to make
any agreement that involved recognizing the union. Subse-
quently, the union issued its demands that: 1) manufacturers
not discriminate in employment or pay on account of union
membership, 2) a joint committee of manufacturers and
workers be established to negotiate disputes, 3) all women
workers see their buttons weighed, 4) all button workers be
reinstated. "The fight now hinges on the recognition of the
union," said one member of the union executive board in mid-
March. In an atmosphere of growing tension, the union voted
to continue the boycott despite the opening of the factories
under reduced production."
DY LATE MARCH, local and national conditions were running
strongly against the odds of a peaceful settlement. On March
26, newspapers reverberated with reports of the disastrous
25. Muscatine News-Tribune, 7 March 1911.
26. Ibid., 17 March, 19 March 1911.
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Triangle Fire in New York City where 146 women died in their
factories. Like many Iowa factories, the Triangle Shirtwaist
Company building was over-crowded, ill-equipped with fire
escapes, and notorious for dangerous working conditions.
In Muscatine various union disturbances caused the city
mayor to issue a proclamation warning the unionists of state
interference if there was more violence. The union warned its
members to stay away from the factories where the distur-
bances had occurred when non-union scabs entered and left the
factories. From the end of March through mid-April there was
minor rioting daily at the factories and at the homes of scab
workers. The mayor and non-union men and women were
pelted with eggs, an acid bomb was thrown in the window of a
scab worker's home, and eleven unionists were arrested."
On April 13, at the request of the local sheriff, twenty-five
strike breakers were brought into Muscatine from Chicago and
St. Louis to act as authorized deputies of peace. A new unlawful
assembly law prohibited the public congregation of more than
three people. Local sources reported that the importation of the
strike breakers caused more disruption to the community than
the earlier union pickets and rallies. Called "sluggers" and
"plug-uglies" by local residents, the strike breakers patrolled the
streets with bats, enforcing the unlawful assembly law by "slug-
ging anybody they thought was a button cutter.""
On the night after the strike breakers' arrival, the unionists
and about five thousand townspeople broke into a city-wide
riot, precipitated by a strike breaker kicking a small girl earlier
that day. The city police came to the aid of the strike breakers,
but the crowd succeeded in driving them into their hotel. One
source recalled that the crowd planned to burn the strike
breakers alive in the hotel, until, ". . . The sheriff got up and
said . . . 'if you don't do this, we will get these people out of
town tomorrow.' And he did. But he brought in the state
militia. . . . " " Three companies of the state militia entered
27. Ibid., 18 March, 1 April, 2 April, 12 April 1911; Des Moines News,
12 April 1911.
28. Muscatine News-Tribune, 14 April 1911; Des Moines News, 12 April
1911; Interview with Mabel Bartenhagen.
29. Interview with Walter Conway.
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the city April 14 and stayed for four days under martial law.
On April 15 the Des Moines News reported that the strike
breakers had been hired by the button manufacturers to agitate
trouble in order to bring the state militia into the city. The logic
was that troops would intimidate the unionists so that they
would go back to work, and that troops could only enter the
city under orders of a governor convinced that troops were
necessary. "The locked-out union did not cause the trouble.
They were as orderly as usual. But promiscuously knocking
down old men, women, and children . . . the imported
Chicago toughs speedily dragged Muscatine into a state of
anarchy and the Governor succumbed to the demands for
troops."^°
In fact, the unionists had not been exceedingly orderly, as
preceding weeks had shown. But the manufacturers could have
had a hand in the agitation. At least five manufacturers wrote
Governor Carroll on March 17 asking for militia protection
from the "riotous mob." All of the letters claimed violence and
rioting, but the governor refused to send the militia at that time.
Ironically, the same day that the manufacturers wrote in con-
cert to Governor Carroll asking for the militia, the Muscatine
News-Tribune reported that "the union fears that something
will be precipitated by hot-headed ones and the union will get
the blame."'^
Two settlements were arranged within the next month. The
latter, in early May, was reached through the intervention of
Governor Carroll. Both times the union broke the settlement.
By mid-May the situation had reached a plateau of mistrust and
antagonism that would keep the union boycotting for twelve
more months.
Unionists claimed that the settlements were too vague.
30. Des Moines News. 15 April 1911.
31. Muscatine News-Tribune, 17 March 1911; Amsterdam Button Co, to
Carroll, U.S. Button Co. to Carroll, Leo H. Hirsch and Co. to Carroll, Hawk-
eye Pearl Button Co. to Carroll, McKee-BHven Button Co. to Carroll, 17
March 1911, Military Correspondence, Governor Beryl F. Carroll Papers,
State Archives, Division of Historical Museum and Archives, Iowa State
Historical Department, Des Moines, Iowa.
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leaving workers' disputes up to individual factory negotiations.
The union claimed that the manufacturers had broken the
settlements first by firing at least fifteen union workers and
cutting wages. Attacks on manufacturers became increasingly
personal, directed at specific "union haters" and "character
assassins" who were black-listing fired unionists, attempting to
bribe workers out of the union, and controlling the press and
public investigations of the factories. "Is a man who boasts that
he will starve those who have worked for him for years . . .
entitled to any consideration at the hands of anyone who has
any sense of humanity? . . . Would the town be worse off if he
moved away7" the union demanded in a special bulletin."
At least one manufacturer was sincerely trying to reconcile
with the union and stabilize the situation. He complained to the
governor that in spite of his efforts to encourage his colleagues
to negotiate, ". . . at the workers'meeting last night they stated
that my work during the past week has simply been a bluff and
that I was a bluffer from start to finish." Other factory owners
were less amenable to reconciliation. John B. Lennon of the AFL
admitted to Governor Carroll that on both sides the situation
was nearly hopeless. "I cannot get [Mr. Umlandt of the Auto-
matic Button Company] to say anything definite. He will talk
about matters that are past but as to the future of putting his
people back to work, he simply says that he is not ready to say
what he will do." "
The alienation was certainly intensified by the union's
practice of name-calling and the manufacturers' public demon-
strations of power politics. Because of the nature of the com-
munity, unionists and other wage earners were often ac-
quainted with the families of the manufacturers. Pin-pointing
individuals as the cause of the trouble was highly instrumental
in perpetuating the problem. Manufacturers maintained an
aloofness from the conflict with public displays that their fac-
tories were functioning without union workers and that they
32. Button Workers Bulletin (Special Edition), Musser Public Library.
33. H. W. Huttig (Huttig Manufacturing Co.) to Carroll, 9 May 1911;
John B. Lennon to Carroll, 22 May 1911, Military Correspondence, Governor
Beryl F. Carroll Papers. ' .i '
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would under no circumstances arbitrate with, or even discuss,
the union. Their efforts to minimize the problem were appar-
ently aided by the local newspapers.
While the manufacturers' near monopoly gave them a
strong political advantage in both local and state government,
the button workers' union supplemented their local community
support with nation-wide union news coverage and financial
support. By the end of the controversy in the spring of 1912, the
union had received over $57,000 from trade unions as far away
as Fresno, California and as large as the Western Federation of
Miners. The AFL contributed $21,500 as strike benefits. The
union used nearly all of these funds for local support and union
activities.^*
News coverage and union reports lessened following the
first few months of the strike. The Democratic Muscatine News-
Tribune which was sympathetic to the union in the first three
months of the strike, abruptly stopped coverage of the labor
situation in mid-May. Other local and state newspapers
covered the Muscatine labor story only infrequently after the
initial three months. This limited documentation allows only
conjectures about the reasons for the final abandonment of the
boycott in the late spring of 1912.
The button manufacturers' political and financial pressure
on the newspapers might have caused the cutback of local news
coverage. Diminishing publicity also might have been a
symptom of the extended conflict. Local community support
apparently lessened during the fifteen-month boycott. The
financial backing of the unionists by sympathetic members of
the community in the first few weeks of the shutdown could
hardly have been sustained for long. Likewise, despite national
union support, the 2,500 button workers first laid off by the
shutdown could not have tolerated more than fifteen months
of continued unemployment. Since button factories offered the
majority of employment in Muscatine, unemployed unionists
would have had difficulty finding other employment. This
would be especially true if the black-listing practices of the
button manufacturers claimed by the unionists were effective
34. life and Labor, December 1911, 378.
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outside of the button factories. In such an employment vacuum,
the entire community was affected financially. As well, con-
tinued riots and a second state militia occupation of the city in
the autumn of 1911 offended and irritated residents on both
sides of the issue. The continued boycott must have become an
increasingly exhausting and hopeless burden to both the strikers
and the community. ,
The dominant agrarian attitudes in Iowa ultimately
affected the progress and outcome of the labor conflict. Lack of
state labor laws allowed the labor conditions which initiated the
strike. The lack of state manufacturing laws caused local manu-
facturers to bond together for support and allowed manufac-
turers' aggressive hold in strike situations, such as the shut-
down, the importation of the strike breakers and the state
militia, and possibly much control of the local newspapers.
These conditions were set in an environment where urban-
industrial conflict was an anomaly to the ethnically homoge-
neous and close-knit community.
In the spring of 1912, the Federal Council Commission of
the Churches of Christ investigated the situation in Muscatine.
Finding that the original labor versus capital conflict had be-
come obscured in the preceding year of the strike, the resulting
report focused on the broader community situation from which
the conflict initially arose. The report emphasized ". . . the
common failure of a community to realize that a local industry
largely determines the community welfare, and is, therefore, a
matter of public concern. . . . Consequentially, the community
must interest itself not simply in getting the strike settled, but in
getting the button industry organized on a basis of justice and
efficiency." "Thebutton workers' strike of 1911-12 was indeed
a matter of public concern, but it soon became a community
burden which neither the manufacturer nor the community was
willing or ready to negotiate.
The Churches of Christ report recommended state investi-
gations of the counting system in the button factories, shell
poisoning and other occupational diseases, night homework
and employment, and conduct of the strike breakers in April
35. Quoted in Life and Labor. July 1912, 220-221.
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1911. As constructive social legislation, the report recom-
mended the formation of a state industrial commission, similar
to those in existence in other agricultural states with growing
industrial interests. Soon after this report, the button workers
strike ended, with neither the union nor the manufacturers
claiming victory. The union disintegrated in everything but
name. The community seemingly was more than willing to
forget the issue.
In 1933 a new button workers' union staged a massive
strike, gained recognition, and improved working conditions
for the button workers in Muscatine. Within a few years, how-
ever, the fresh-water pearl button industry was on the decline
due to the rise of cheap plastic. Today in Muscatine there is no
fresh-water pearl button manufacturing, although a few of the
old factories have converted to plastic button manufacturing.
The process of making plastic buttons remains much the same,
although resin has replaced shells and machines have advanced
to higher efficiency.
Muscatine never developed into a large industrial center,
perhaps because of the rise of plastics and the unfilled vacuum
following the decline of the button factories. For whatever
reasons, the community had a hand in deciding its own char-
acter. As seen in the industrial conflict of 1911-12, the com-
munity remained decidedly rural, despite opposing urban-
industrial pressures,
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